TL;DR: TokenLogic proposes changes to Aave's reserve factors across 54 reserves. Its model estimates $3.5 million in additional annual revenue, using November 9 balances and rates; governance has not yet approved the changes.
Aave's latest revenue proposal focuses on how lending income is divided. A November 12 submission from TokenLogic covers 12 V3 instances and V2 Ethereum, with the modeled blended reserve factor rising from 12.0% to 12.7%.
The practical issue is straightforward: the protocol treasury would retain a larger share of interest, leaving a smaller share for suppliers where a change applies. Whether that improves the economics over time depends partly on how those suppliers respond.
What the reserve factor controls
Aave's official FAQ defines the reserve factor as the percentage of borrowing interest that accrues to the treasury. It is set for each asset through governance. The treasury is controlled by Aave Governance, rather than functioning as a conventional company's bank account.
A simplified example makes the mechanism clearer. Suppose borrowers generate $100 of interest and a reserve factor is 20%. Before considering other mechanics, $20 goes to the treasury and $80 remains for suppliers. Raising the factor to 25% changes that split to $25 and $75. The underlying $100 of interest has not grown simply because the allocation changed.
This hypothetical illustrates why a higher reserve factor can improve treasury receipts while reducing the attractiveness of supplying to the same market. It also shows why the percentage should not be read as an annual return paid to either group.
Suppliers face different effects across markets
TokenLogic proposes moving Ethereum Core DAI's factor from 25% to 30%, while Avalanche V3 USDC would move from 10% to 25%. The proposal's stated purpose includes changing incentives across legacy markets as Aave's newer infrastructure develops.
The immediate parameter change does not itself alter the borrower interest rate. Over time, however, a supplier response could change available liquidity and utilisation. Those subsequent effects make it important to distinguish a mechanical estimate from a forecast of the eventual outcome.
NewsBTC's report on Aave's externally curated V4 markets offers context on how the protocol is developing different arrangements for managing liquidity and risk.
V4 provides a different destination for activity
Aave's official protocol changelog records the launch of V4 on Ethereum in March and on Avalanche in July. The architecture groups liquidity into hubs and lending activity into separate spokes, giving the network a different way to organise markets.
That deployment history helps explain why comparisons between versions now matter commercially. A supplier considering a change in yield can compare not only competing protocols but also different Aave deployments, with their own assets, liquidity conditions and operational characteristics.
Our reading is that governance is making an allocation decision about where activity should be encouraged. That deserves scrutiny at the individual-market level: a portfolio-wide revenue estimate can hide quite different experiences for suppliers of different assets.
The estimate still has to survive market behaviour
The revenue figure annualises a snapshot. Borrowed balances can rise or fall, interest rates can change, and liquidity can move after a parameter update. The estimate therefore gives a basis for comparison, while the realised result remains open.
Governance also has to consider the cost of retaining liquidity and the resilience of each market. An extra dollar of treasury income is less useful if the settings create an offsetting loss of activity or a more fragile funding base.
Interest in AAVE ownership, including Payward's recently disclosed investment, makes these economic decisions relevant to a wider audience. The next steps are community feedback and an onchain proposal, followed by measurable results if the changes are approved and executed.
written by the News Desk and edited by Samuel Rae.
